Prefácio by Heidegger, Martin
Preface1
Dear Father Richardson:
It is with some hesitation that I attempt to answer the two
principal questions you posed in your letter of March 1, 1962. The
first touches on the initial impetus that determined the way my
thought would go. The other looks for information about the
much discussed reversal [in my development].
I hesitate with my answers, for they are necessarily no more
than indications [of much more to be said]. The lesson of long
experience leads me to surmise that such indications will not be
taken as directions for the road of independent reflection on the
matter pointed out which each must travel for himself. [Instead
they] will gain notice as though they were an opinion I had
expressed, and will be propagated as such. Every effort to bring
what has been thought closer to prevailing modes of (re)presen-
tation must assimilate what-is-to-be-thought to those (re)presen-
tations and thereby inevitably deform the matter.
This preamble is not the lament of a man misunderstood;
it is rather the recognition of an almost insurmountable difficulty
in making oneself understood.
The first question in your letter reads: How are we properly
to understand your first experience of the Being-question in
Brentano? In Brentano. You have in mind the fact that the
first philosophical text through which I worked my way, again and
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again from 1907 on, was Franz Brentanos dissertation: On the
Manifold Sense of Being in Aristotle (1862). On the title page of his
work, Brentano quotes Aristotles phrase: to on legetai pollachos. I
translate: A being becomes manifest (sc. with regard to its
Being) in many ways. Latent in this phrase is the question that
determined the way of my thought: what is the pervasive, simple,
unified determination of Being that permeates all of its multiple
meanings? This question raised others: What, then, does Being
mean? To what extent (why and how) does the Being of beings
unfold in the four modes which Aristotle constantly affirms, but
whose common origin he leaves undetermined? One need but
run over the names assigned to them in the language of the
philosophical tradition to be struck by the fact that they seem, at
first, irreconcilable: Being as property, Being as possibility and
actuality, Being as truth, Being as schema of the categories. What
sense of Being comes to expression in these four headings? How
can they be brought into comprehensible accord?
This accord can not be grasped without first raising and
settling the question: whence does Being as such (not merely
beings as beings) receive its determination?
Meanwhile a decade went by and a great deal of swerving
and straying through the history of Western philosophy was
needed for the above questions to reach even an initial clarity. To
gain this clarity three insights were decisive, though, to be sure,
not yet sufficient for the venture of analysing the Being-question
as a question about the sense of Being.
Dialogues with Husserl provided the immediate experience
of the phenomenological method that prepared the concept of
phenomenology explained in the Introduction to Being and Time
(§ 7). In this evolution a normative role was played by the
reference back to fundamental words of Greek thought which I
interpreted accordingly: logos (to make manifest) and phainesthai
(to show oneself).
A renewed study of the Aristotelian treatises (especially
Book IX of the Metaphysics and Book VI of the Nicomachean
Ethics) resulted in the insight into aletheuein as a process of
revealment, and in the characterisation of truth as non-concealment,
12
FILOSOFIA UNISINOS Vol. 5 N” 8 JAN/JUN 2004
to which all self-manifestation of beings pertains. Only someone
who is thinking superficially or, indeed, not thinking at all can
content himself with the observation that Heidegger conceives
truth as non-concealment. As if with a-letheia what is properly
worthy-of-thought did not take merely a first approximate
form.2 The situation is not improved by proposing the translation
non-forgotten-ness in place of non-conceal-ment. For
forgotten-ness [too] must be thought in Greek fashion as
withdrawal into concealment. Correspondingly, the counter-
phenomenon to forgetting, [sc.] remembering, must receive a
[genuinely] Greek interpretation which sees it as a striving after,
an attaining to, the non-concealed. Platos anamnesis of the Ideas
implies: catching-sight-once-again, [hence] the revealing, of beings,
sc. in that by which they shine-forth.
With the insight into aletheia as non-concealment came
recognition of the fundamental trait of ousia, the Being of beings:
presence. But a literal translation, sc. a translation that thought
draws out of the matter itself, is expressive only when the heart of
the matter, in this case Presence as such, is brought before
thought. The disquieting, ever watchful question about Being
under the guise of Presence (Present) developed into the question
about Being in terms of its time-character. As soon as this happened,
it became clear that the traditional concept of time was in no
respect adequate even for correctly posing the question concerning
the time-character of Presence, to say nothing of answering it.
Time became questionable in the same way as Being. The ecstatic-
horizontal temporality delineated in Being and Time is not by any
means already the most proper attribute of time that must be
sought in answer to the Being-question.
Subsequent to this tentative clarification of aletheia and
ousia, the meaning and scope of the principle of phenomenology,
to the things themselves, became clear. As my familiarity with
phenomenology grew, no longer merely through literature but by
actual practice, the question about Being, aroused by Brentanos
13
FILOSOFIA UNISINOS Vol. 5 N” 8 JAN/JUN 2004
2 [Translators note. Possibly: ... As if [it were] not with a-letheia [that] what is properly
speaking worthy-of-thought reached a first liminal appearance... .]
work, nevertheless remained always in view. So it was that doubt
arose whether the thing itself was to be characterised as intentional
consciousness, or even as the transcendental ego. If, indeed,
phenomenology, as the process of letting things manifest themselves,
should characterise the standard method of philosophy, and if
from ancient times the guide-question of philosophy has perdured
in the most diverse forms as the question about the Being of
beings, then Being had to remain the first and last thing-itself of
thought.
Meanwhile phenomenology in Husserls sense was
elaborated into a distinctive philosophical position according to a
pattern set by Descartes, Kant and Fichte. The historicity of
thought remained completely foreign to such a position (see the
too little observed work of Husserl: Philosophy as a strict Science,
which appeared 1910-11 in the review Logos, pp. 289 ff.).
The Being-question, unfolded in Being and Time, parted
company with this philosophical position, and that on the basis of
what to this day I still consider a more faithful adherence to the
principle of phenomenology.
What a few strokes can thus sketch, in retrospect that
verges constantly on retractatio, was, in its historical reality, a
tangled process, inscrutable even to me.3 This process inevitably
remained captive to contemporary modes of (re)presentation and
language, and was accompanied by inadequate explanations of its
own intentions.
Now if in the title of your book, From Phenomenology to
Thought, you understand Phenomenology in the sense just
described as a philosophical position of Husserl, then the title is to
the point, insofar as the Being-question as posed by me is something
completely different from that position. The title is fully justified,
if the term Thought is shorn of that ambiguity which allows it to
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cover on the one hand metaphysical thought (the thinking of the
Being of beings) and on the other the Being-question, sc. the
thinking of Being as such (the revealed-ness of Being).
If, however, we understand Phenomenology as the [process
of] allowing the most proper concern of thought to show itself,
then the title should read Through Phenomenology to the Thinking
of Being. This possessive [of Being], then, says that Being as such
(Beon) shows itself simultaneously as that which is to-be-thought
and as that which has want of a thought corresponding to it.
This indication already brings me to touch upon your
second question. It reads: Granted that a reversal has come-to-
pass in your thinking, how has it come-to-pass? In other words,
how are [we] to think this coming-to-pass itself?
Your question admits of an answer only if first we make
clear what reversal means, [or] more precisely, if one is ready to
think through in becoming fashion what has already been said,
instead of constantly circulating unwarranted assertions. The
first time in my published writings that I spoke of the reversal
was in the Letter on Humanism (1947, p. 71; separate edition,
p. 17). The inference has thus been drawn that since 1947
Heideggers thought has undergone in-version, or even, since
1945, con-version. No allowance whatever is made for reflection
on the fact that a good number of years are needed before the
thinking through of so decisive a matter can find its way into the
clear. Perhaps the text cited below will serve to show that the
matter thought in the term reversal was already at work in my
thinking ten years prior to 1947. The thinking of the reversal is a
change in my thought. But this change is not a consequence of
altering the standpoint, much less of abandoning the fundamental
issue, of Being and Time. The thinking of the reversal results from
the fact that I stayed with the matter-for-thought [of] Being and
Time, sc. by inquiring into that perspective which already in
Being and Time (p. 39) was designated as Time and Being.
The reversal is above all not an operation of interrogative
thought; it is inherent in the very matter designated by the
headings: Being and Time, Time and Being. For this reason,
the passage cited from the Letter on Humanism reads: Here
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the Whole is reversed. The Whole: this means the matter
[involved] in Being and Time, Time and Being. The reversal
is in play within the matter itself. Neither did I invent it nor does
it affect merely my thought. Up to now I know of no attempt to
reflect on this matter and analyse it critically. Instead of the
groundless, endless prattle about the reversal, it would be more
advisable and fruitful if people would simply engage themselves in
the matter mentioned. Refusal to do so obliges one ipso facto to
demonstrate that the Being-question developed in Being and
Time is unjustified, superfluous and impossible. Any criticism of
Being and Time starting in this fashion, however, must obviously
first be set straight.
One need only observe the simple fact that in Being and
Time the problem is set up outside the sphere of subjectivism 
that the entire anthropological problematic is kept at a distance,
that the normative issue is emphatically and solely the experience
of There-being with a constant eye to the Being-question  for it
to become strikingly clear that the Being into which Being and
Time inquired can not long remain something that the human
subject posits. It is rather Being, stamped as Presence by its
time-character, [that] makes the approach to There-being. As a
result, even in the initial steps of the Being-question in Being and
Time thought is called upon to undergo a change whose movement
cor-responds with the reversal.
And yet, the basic question of Being and Time is not in any
sense abandoned by reason of the reversal. Accordingly, the
prefatory note to the seventh unrevised edition of Being and Time
(1957) contains the remark: [This] way still remains even today
a necessary one, if the question about Being is to stir our There-
being. Contrary [to what is generally supposed], the question of
Being and Time is decisively ful-filled in the thinking of the
reversal. He alone can ful-fill who has a vision of fullness.4
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This fulfillment likewise furnishes for the first time an adequate
characterisation of There-being, sc. of the essence of man [as]
thought in terms of the truth of Being as such (cf. Being and Time
§ 66). Accordingly, the first draft of the lecture course for the
winter semester of 1937-38, which tries to analyse the necessity of
the question of truth in the perspective of the question of Being,
reads in part:
Over and over again we must insist: In the question of truth as
posed here, what is at stake is not only an alteration in the
traditional conception of truth, nor a complement of its current
(re)presentation; what is at stake is a transformation in mans
Being itself. This transformation is not demanded by new psycholog-
ical or biological insights. Man here is not the object of any
anthropology whatever. Man comes into question here in the
deepest and broadest, in the genuinely fundamental, perspective:
man in his relation to Being  sc. in the reversal: Beon and its truth
in relation to man.
The coming-to-pass of the reversal which you ask about
is Beon as such. It can only be thought out of the reversal. There
is no special kind of coming-to-pass that is proper to this [process].
Rather, the reversal between Being and Time, between Time and
Being, is determined by the way Being is granted, Time is granted.
I tried to say a word about this is granted in the lecture Time
and Being which you heard yourself here [in Freiburg] on January
30, 1962.5
If instead of Time we substitute: the lighting-up of the
self-concealing [that is proper to] the process of coming-to- presence,
then Being is determined by the scope of Time. This comes about,
however, only insofar as the lighting-process of self-concealment
assumes unto its want a thought that corresponds to it.
[The process of] presenc-ing (Being) is inherent in the
lighting-up of self-concealment (Time). [The] lighting-up of self-
concealment (Time) brings forth the process of presenc-ing (Being). 17
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It is [due] neither [to] the merit of my questioning nor [to
some] arbitrary decision of my thought that this reciprocal bearing
reposes in a [mutual] ap-propriation and is called e-vent (cf.
Identity and Difference, p. 30 ff.). The fact that what we thoughtlessly
enough call truth the Greeks called A-LØtheia  as well, indeed,
in poetical and non-philosophical as in philosophical language 
is not [a result of] their [own] invention and caprice. It is the
richest endowment of their language, in which that-which-
comes-to-presence as such attained non-concealment and 
concealment. Without an eye for the granting of such a gift to
man, without a sense for the e-mitting of such an e-mittence, one
will no more comprehend what is said about the mittence of
Being than the man born blind can ever experience what light
and color are.
The distinction you make between Heidegger I and II is
justified only on the condition that this is kept constantly in
mind: only by way of what [Heidegger] I has thought does one
gain access to what is to-be-thought by [Heidegger] II. But the
thought of [Heidegger] I becomes possible only if it is contained
in [Heidegger] II.
Meanwhile, every formulation is open to misunderstanding.
In proportion to the intrinsically manifold matter of Being and
Time, all words which give it utterance (like reversal, forgotten-
ness and mittence) are always ambiguous. Only a [commen-
surately] manifold thought succeeds in uttering the heart of this
matter in a way that cor-responds with it.
This manifold thought requires, however, not a new language
but a transformed relationship to the essenc[-ing] of the old one.
My wish for your work  for which you alone bear the
responsibility  is this: may it help set in motion the manifold
thinking of the simple business of thought, which, by reason of its
very simplicity, abounds in hidden plenitude.
Freiburg im Breisgau, early April, 1962
Martin Heidegger
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